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Cognition and Comprehension: 
Viewing and Forgetting in Mildred Pierce 
David Bordwell 
By and large, audiences understand the films they see. They can answer 
questions about a movie's plot, imagine alternative scenes ("What if the 
monster hadn't found the couple. . . ?"), and discuss the film with someone 
else who has seen it. This brute fact of comprehension, Christian Metz 
asserted in the mid-1960s, could ground semiotic film theory. "The fact that 
must be understood is that films are understood."1 
As semiotic research expanded in France, Britain, and the US, the search 
for explanations of filmic intelligibility took theorists toward comparisons with 
language, toward methodological analogies with linguistic inquiry, and across 
several disciplines. Yet these developments increasingly left abandoned the 
search for principles governing intelligibility. Theorists turned their attention 
to understanding the sources of cinematic pleasure by defining "spectatorship" 
within theories of ideology and psychoanalysis. The conceptual weaknesses 
and empirical shortcomings of the latter doctrines have become increasingly 
evident in recent years; it seems fair to say that interest in them has waned 
considerably, and several French partisans of psychoanalysis have returned to 
the "classic" structuralist semiotics of the 1960s and early 1970s.2 
The current "cognitivist" trend in film studies has gone back to Metz's 
point of departure, asking: What enables films-at least, narrative films-to be 
understood? But the hypotheses that have been proposed recently differ 
sharply from those involved in semiotic research. The emerging cognitivist 
paradigm suggests that it is unlikely that spectators apply a set of "codes" to a 
film in order to make sense of it. Rather, spectators participate in a complex 
process of actively elaborating what the film sets forth. They "go beyond the 
information given," in Jerome Bruner's phrase. This does not entail that each 
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spectator's understanding of the film becomes completely idiosyncratic, for 
there are grounds for believing that the patterns of elaboration are shared by 
many spectators.3 
For example, you are driving down the highway. You spot a car with a 
flat tire; a man is just opening up the car's trunk. Wholly without conscious 
deliberation, you expect that he is the driver and that he will draw out a tool 
or a spare tire or both. How we understand such a prosaic action is still 
largely a mystery, but it seems terribly unlikely that understanding is achieved 
by virtue of a code. In a strict sense, a code is an arbitrary system of alterna-
tives, governed by rules of succession or substitution and learned more or less 
explicitly. It seems unlikely that there is a code for understanding tire-
changing behavior. Now imagine filming the very same activity. In the 
absence of prior information to the contrary (say, an earlier scene showing the 
driver depositing a corpse in the trunk), you would conjure up the same expec-
tation. As in the real-life instance, no appeal to a code seems necessary. 
This example suggests that the process of understanding many things in 
films is more likely to draw upon ordinary, informal reasoning procedures. 
Contrary to much film theory of the 1970s and 1980s, we need not ascribe this 
activity to the Freudian or Lacanian unconscious. Just as you did not learn a 
code for tire-changing, so is there no reason for your expectation to be 
ascribed to repressed childhood memories purportedly harbored in your 
unconscious. Presented with a set of circumstances (flat tire, man opening 
trunk), you categorize it (Driver Changing Flat Tire) and draw an informal, 
probabilistic conclusion, based on a structured piece of knowledge about what 
is normally involved in changing a tire. 
This is not to say that only real-world knowledge is relevant to under-
standing films. Obviously in real life it would be unlikely that a space alien 
would pop out of the car's trunk, but if the film is in a certain genre, that 
might be a very likely alternative that the spectator would have to consider. 
And certain technical choices, such as slow-motion or fragmentary editing, 
require experience of movies in order to be intelligible to viewers. But the 
point would be that even genre-based or stylistic conventions are still learned 
and applied through processes exercised in ordinary thinking. No special 
instruction, parallel to that of learning a code like language or even sema-
phore, is necessary to pick up the conventions of horror films or slow-motion 
violence. 
Looked at from the cognitive perspective, understanding narrative films 
can be seen as largely a matter of "cognizing." Going beyond the information 
given involves categorizing, drawing on prior knowledge, making informal, 
provisional inferences, and hypothesizing what is likely to happen next. To be 
a skilled spectator is to know how to execute these tacit but determining acts. 
The goal, as story comprehension researchers have indicated, is at least partly 
Soring 1992 185 
the extraction of "gist."4 When confronted with a narrative, perceivers seek to 
grasp the crux or fundamental features of the event. Transforming a scene 
into gist-the basic action that occurs, its consequences for the characters and 
the ensuing action—becomes a basis for higher-level, more complex reactions. 
This perspective has implications for how we look at the films as well. 
Rather than searching for a "language" of film, we ought to look for the ways 
in which films are designed to elicit the sorts of cognizing activities which will 
lead to comprehension. Put another way: Not all spectators are filmmakers, 
but all filmmakers are spectators. It is not implausible to posit that they have 
gained an intuitive, hands-on knowledge of how to elicit the sort of activities 
that will create the experience they want the spectator to have. True, the 
design may misfire, or spectators may choose to pursue alternative strategies 
of sense-making. But as a first step in a research program, it makes sense to 
postulate that filmmakers-scriptwriters, producers, directors, editors, and other 
artisans of the screen-build their films in ways which will coax most of their 
spectators to follow similar elaborational pathways. 
This paper, then, is an attempt to show how the cognitive perspective can 
help us examine a film's narrative design. Before tackling a particular 
example, though, I need to spell out my theoretical frame of reference a little 
more. 
I 
Let us take a film to be a complex system made up of sub-systems: 
narrative processes, thematic relations, stylistic patterns, and perhaps others. 
The film's subsystems can be located historically with respect to wider sets of 
customary practices, which I shall call norms. To take a straightforward 
example, it is a norm of Hollywood studio filmmaking since the mid-teens that 
dramatic action takes place in a coherently unified space. That space 
portrayed through such devices as continuity editing, constancy of landmarks, 
and so on. 
We can think of norm-driven subsystems as supplying cues to the specta-
tor. The cues initiate the process of elaboration, resulting eventually in 
inferences and hypotheses. The spectator brings to the cues various bodies of 
relevant knowledge, most notably the sort known to cognitive theorists as 
schema-based knowledge. A schema is a knowledge structure that enables the 
perceiver to extrapolate beyond the information given.5 Our schema for car 
breakdowns enables us to fill in what is not given to perception in the flat-tire 
situation. 
Understanding a film calls upon cues and schemata constantly. For 
example, a series of shots showing characters positioned and framed in 
particular ways usually cue the viewer to infer that these characters are located 
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in a particular locale. A scene which begins with a detail shot of a table lamp 
may prompt the spectator to frame hypotheses to the effect that the scene will 
take place in a living room or parlor. These inferences and hypotheses could 
not get off the ground without schemata. The spectator of a Hollywood film 
is able to understand that a space is coherent because at some level of mental 
activity she or he possesses a schema for typical locales, such as living rooms. 
Similarly, in the spectator's search for gist, s/he must possess some 
rudimentary notion of narrative structure which permits certain information to 
be taken for granted and other information to be understood as, say, exposi-
tion or an important revelation. Finally, I suggest that all these factors vary 
historically. We ought to expect that different filmmaking traditions, in various 
times and places, will develop particular norms, schemata, and cues. 
Correspondingly, the inferences and hypotheses available to spectators will vary 
as well. 
My outline is very skeletal, so I shall try to put some flesh on the bones 
by considering a concrete case. My specimen is Mildred Pierce, an instantiation 
of that vast body of norms known as the classical Hollywood cinema.6 I shall 
be concentrating on its system of narration, which involves not only its 
construction of a plot and a diegetic world, but also its use of film technique. 
First, I shall try to show that the film utilizes norms of narration so as to 
encourage not one but two avenues of inference and hypothesis-testing; both 
of these would seem to have been available to contemporary audiences. 
Secondly, I want to show that the film assumes that in the viewer's effort after 
gist she or he will ignore or forget certain stylistic norms. That is, Hollywood 
norms posit a hierarchy of importance, with narrative gist at the top and local 
stylistic manipulations subordinated to that. This hierarchy allows the 
filmmakers to conceal crucial narrational deceptions. 
II 
Since Mildred Pierce opens with a murder, it is profitable to start our 
inquiry with a norm-based question. What kinds of options were open to 
filmmakers in the 1940s who wished to launch their plot with such a scene? 
In the early 1940s, the options were essentially two. One is exemplified 
by the second scene of The Maltese Falcon (1941). Here, the murder of Sam 
Spade's partner Miles Archer is rendered in a way that conceals the killer's 
identity. In this case, a reverse-shot view of the murderer has been 
suppressed. The film thus poses the question of who killed Archer, and this 
creates one strand in the overall mystery plot. 
A second normative option is exemplified in The Letter (1940). Here the 
opening murder of a colonialist is plainly committed by the Bette Davis 
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character. The question posed is now that of why she killed him. What, if 
any, circumstances, justify the crime? 
The first two scenes of Mildred Pierce, however, offer a more complex 
case. In a lonely beach house at night, with a car idling outside, a man is shot 
by an unseen assailant. As he dies, he murmurs: "Mildred." We glimpse a 
woman driving off in the car. In the next scene, our protagonist Mildred 
Pierce is seen wandering along a deserted pier. 
If one wanted a straightforward illustration of the inferential basis of 
cinema, one could do worse than to study these opening few moments. In a 
remarkably brief time-the murder scene lasts only forty seconds-the spectator 
has accomplished a great deal. S/he has perceptually constructed a diegetic 
world-a beach house at night-peopled by two characters. This seems simple 
enough, but we are very far from understanding how it takes place. In any 
event, spectators infer that a murder has taken place; that "gist" would seem 
to be central to comprehension of this narrative. Only a little less probable is 
the inference that the killer has fled by car. And the spectator may also have 
inferred that the murderer is the woman named in the film's title. 
Yet such inferences are not one-time-only products. They form the basis 
of hypotheses, which lead in turn to further inference-making. As Meir 
Sternberg points out, narrative ineluctably leads us to frame hypotheses about 
the past (so-called "curiosity" hypotheses) and about the future (so-called "sus-
pense" hypotheses).7 Here, the spectator will expect that there are prior 
reasons for the murder of Monty, and that the film will reveal them in its 
progressive unfolding. As a mystery film, Mildred Pierce will, so to speak, 
create suspense hypotheses about how curiosity hypotheses will be confirmed. 
We can specify two principal inference-chains which this opening 
encourages. One is that Mildred is the killer. Most critics have assumed that 
the average spectator comes to this conclusion, and they characteristically take 
the opening as carefully directing us to form this inference. First, like the 
Maltese Falcon sequence, the scene does not show who fires at Monty; this 
poses the question of the murderer's identity. Moreover, Mildred is implied 
to be the killer on the basis of certain cues: the word "Mildred," which Monty 
murmurs before he dies; the smooth transition from the murder to Mildred 
walking along the pier; the consequent scene in which she tries to frame Wally 
for the crime; the still later scene in which the police accuse her ex-husband 
Bert of the murder. 
At the film's climax we will learn that Mildred is not the killer. The 
film's opening narration has misdirected us. By suppressing the identity of the 
killer, and by using tight linkages between scenes, the narration leads the 
spectator to false curiosity hypotheses. One critic puts the point this way: the 
film shifts from asking, "Who killed Monty?" to asking, "Why did Mildred kill 
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him?"8 Indeed, the film could not mislead us were we not involved in a 
process of hypothesis-formation and revision. 
Yet a second line of inference is available. The blatant suppression of the 
murderer's identity might lead the viewer to ask: If Mildred did it, why does 
the film not show her doing so (as the opening of The Letter acknowledges its 
heroine's guilt)? 
One plausible reason for the film's equivocation was offered by a contempo-
rary critic: 
We are tempted to suspect the murderer is the woman on the 
bridge, especially when we learn her name is Mildred. 
But naturally, being familiar with the conventions of mystery 
stories that appearances deceive and circumstantial evidence is not 
all, we are wary; indeed we feel that somehow we had better not 
assume that Mildred Pierce Berargon [sic] has just killed the man 
we duly learn is her second husband.9 
Under this construal, the cohesion devices will be seen, at the moment or in 
retrospect, as so many red herrings, tricky but "fair" in the way that misdi-
rection is in, say, an Agatha Christie novel. 
We commonly believe that not all spectators make exactly the same 
inferences, but this film builds such divergences into its structure by creating 
a pair of alternative pathways for the viewer. One path is signposted for the 
"trusting" spectator, who assumes that Mildred is the killer and who will watch 
what follows looking for answers to why she did it. There is also a pathway 
for the "skeptical" viewer, who will not take her guilt for granted. This 
spectator will scan the ensuing film for other factors that could plausibly 
account for the circumstances of the killing. And needless to say, it would be 
possible for an empirical viewer to switch between these alternative 
hypotheses, or to rank one as more probable than the other. If the goal of the 
inferential process is that extraction of gist that I have been calling "story 
construction," then the filmmakers set for themselves the task of building a 
system of cues that can be used in both frameworks, "trusting" and "skeptical." 
Across the whole film, hypothesis-forming and -testing will be guided by 
cues of various sorts and subordinated to various sorts of schemata. As a first 
approximation, let us distinguish between two principal varieties of schemata. 
Some schemata will enable the spectator to assimilate and order cues on the 
basis of patterns of action; let us call these action -based schemata. The story-
comprehension research literature offers many particular instances; the 
canonical macrostructure proposed by Jean Mandler and her colleagues is a 
salient case. Here both the trusting and the skeptical spectator will test 
hypotheses according to the ways in which events fill various slots in the 
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macrostructure: the definition of "setting," or expository information; the 
formation of goals; the emergence of complex reactions; and so on.10 
In Mildred Pierce, for instance, the spectator could be said to take the 
scene that follows the murder as Mildred's complex reaction to having 
committed the crime: she attempts suicide. Thwarted in that, she formulates 
a new goal: to implicate the lubricious Wally in the crime. Her luring him to 
the beach house and locking him in thus follows as a subgoal to this larger 
purpose. Each episode will spring from a reaction to prior events and lead to 
a formulation of subgoals that initiate further action, and each one offers 
further evidence for the trusting construal while not definitively disconfirming 
the skeptical one. Thus the potential uncertainty about the murderer—the 
basis of the skeptical viewer's curiosity hypotheses—is maintained across the 
film. 
Another general collection of schemata is relevant as well, one that we 
can label age/tf-based schemata. It is significant, I think, that Mandler's 
canonical story reduces character identity and activity to plot functions 
(reaction, goal-formation, and so on). In this respect it resembles Structuralist 
work in narratology, such as the studies by Propp, Greimas, and Barthes. Yet 
one can recognize that characters are constructs without acknowledging that 
they are reducible to more fundamental structural features. This would seem 
a particularly necessary move to make if you are studying cinema, since here, 
as opposed to literature, characters are usually specifically embodied. They 
are part of the process of filmic perception. A reaction or a goal is almost 
always attached to a face and frame. Barthes may be content to consider a 
novel's character no more than a collection of semes, or semantic features, 
gathered under a proper name11; but in cinema the character has a palpable 
autonomy that seems to make action subordinate to his/her prior existence. 
Thus the fact that Monty is not only a victim in the murder scene but also a 
specific individual, sure to be important in the narrative to come, must count 
for a good deal if we are to follow the process of inference and hypothesis-
casting. Similarly, that Mildred happens to occupy Joan Crawford's 
body-rather than that, say, of Lucille Ball or even Bette Davis-is not a matter 
of indifference. 
How spectators construct character, of course, remains quite mysterious 
to us. Without elaborating much on it here, I would simply suggest that in any 
narrative in any medium, characters are built up by the perceiver by virtue of 
two sorts of agent-based schemata. One sort comprises a set of institutional 
roles (e.g., teacher, father, boss, etc.). Another sort of agent-based schema is 
that afforded by the concept of the person, a prototype possessing a cluster of 
several default features: a human body, perceptual activity, thoughts, feelings, 
traits, and a capacity to plan and execute action.12 Roughly, then, a character 
consists of some person-like features plus the social roles which s/he fills. 
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This distinction would seem to be constant across cultures, even if the 
substantive conceptions of agent and role vary.13 
Aided by role schemata and the person schema, the spectator can build 
up the narrative's agents to various degrees of individuality. Thus in the 
course of the film we are considering, Mildred can be taken as "excessively 
self-sacrificing mother," as "heedless wife," as "vindictive business manager," 
and so on. Each of these constructions can coexist with the trusting construal 
(the reasons why Mildred would kill Monty are rooted in her personality and 
motives) and with the skeptical construal (even if such characterizations are 
accurate, they may not actually lead to the murder we more or less witness). 
And we should note that this construction of Mildred as a character-person 
plus roles-constitutes no less an effort after gist than does the construal of the 
murder scene. The viewer plays down or omits concrete details of character 
action in order to construct a psychic identity and agency of broad import, 
capable of being integrated into hypotheses about upcoming or past action. 
Such hypotheses are of course constrained in the overall course of the 
film. After Mildred has lured Wally into being found at the scene of the 
murder, she is taken in for questioning. As she tells her story to the police in 
a series of flashbacks, the film breaks into two large-scale portions, and both 
action- and agent-based schemata are involved in each. 
The first part consists of the lengthy flashback showing us Mildred's rise 
to business success. One purpose of this is to establish that her former 
husband Bert has a motive for killing Monty. This long flashback ends with 
Bert's granting Mildred a divorce and insultingly knocking the whiskey out of 
Monty's hand, In the framing story, the Police Inspector argues that this 
confirms Bert's guilt. And indeed Bert's willingness to take the blame initially 
confirms that he is shielding Mildred. Once again, though, this permits two 
alternative readings of the aciton. Our trusting viewer, who believes Mildred 
guilty, takes this as confirming that conviction. The more suspicious viewer, 
aware of the manipulations of the genre conventions, is likely to suspect that 
such an obvious foil for Mildred may conceal more than this. That is, just as 
Mildred has been a red herring for the real culprit, Bert is a red herring once 
removed, delaying the revelation of the real killer. 
At the end of this framing portion in the police station, Mildred confesses 
to the crime. This switches attention away from Bert and back to her. But 
her confession creates a problem in motivation. At the end of the first 
flashback Mildred is portrayed as being completely in love with Monty. The 
task of the next long flashback is to show how she could become capable of 
murdering him. 
The flashback traces her gradual realization that Monty is deeply 
immoral. In addition, she must be shown to be capable of murder. Here the 
crucial scene is her high-pitched quarrel with Veda, in which Mildred orders 
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her to leave: "Get out before I kill you." The crisis of this portion comes 
when Mildred learns that Monty has destroyed her business on the very night 
of Veda's birthday. Mildred takes out a revolver and goes to Monty's beach 
house. This puts her firmly on the scene of the crime. 
Confirming that Mildred committed the murder would clinch the trusting 
viewer's long-range hypothesis on the basis of action-based schemata. Killing 
Monty becomes Mildred's means to the goal of protecting her daughter, a goal 
she has held throughout her life. The resolution would also invoke person-
plus-role schemata: Mildred remains the self-sacrificing mother to the end. 
But this resolution is invoked only to be dispelled. 
Once more we return to the present and the Inspector announces that the 
police have captured the real murderer. Veda is brought in and, believing that 
Mildred has implicated her, blurts out a confession. And Mildred's recitation 
of the events leads to the final flashback, which we enter with knowledge of 
the killer's identity. As in The Letter, the interest now falls upon what 
circumstances triggered the murder, and how those vary from our initial 
impression. 
Mildred narrates one more flashback. It shows her arrival at the beach 
house and her discovery that Monty and Veda are lovers. She pulls the pistol, 
but Monty dissuades her and she drops it. Mildred goes outside, and Veda 
learns from Monty that he no longer loves her. As Mildred is about to drive 
away, Veda shoots Monty. Mildred hurries in and discovers the crime, but 
through a mixture of lies and cajoling, Veda convinces her not to call the 
police. 
This, the real climax, constitutes a confirmation of the skeptical frame of 
reference, since now we learn the reason that the killer's identity was withheld. 
Moreover, all of Mildred's subsequent behavior is consistent with the fact that 
Veda killed Monty. This action triggers the same motherly sacrifice, the same 
set of goals, that have defined Mildred as agent. Everything that we saw at the 
start of the film is retrospectively justified by Mildred's acting as Veda's 
accomplice. 
Again, however, to arrive at this concluding set of inferences is to 
continue our effort after gist. This ending reveals that the filmmakers are 
"practical cognitive psychologists." They know, for instance, the importance of 
default assumptions. One purpose of the murder scene is to make us assume 
that only one person is present when Monty is killed. This is crucial because 
even if we were not shown who pulls the trigger, the viewer must not suspect 
Veda at all. If her presence is even hinted at, the redundant and obvious clues 
pointing to Mildred will be seen immediately for the red herrings they are. 
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III 
Reading involves forgetting, notes Barthes in S/z14; so does viewing. The 
ending of Mildred Pierce is instructive partly because the film is so made as to 
exploit our likely inability to remember anything but the material made salient 
by our ongoing inference-making and hypothesis-testing. Our filmmakers are 
practical psychologists, and they know that we will construct a diegetic world 
chiefly through landmarks. We will move rapidly from items of appearance 
and behavior to characterization. Above all, we are likely to overlook stylistic 
features under pressure of the clock. This last aspect is especially critical in 
Mildred Pierce, 
Above I compared the film to a mystery novel in its use of red herrings, 
but the film compells us to recognize that certain features of the film medium 
govern the maker's calculations regarding our inferential activity. For although 
few readers may dutifully page back to check a fact or appreciate how they 
were misled, every reader has the option of doing so. A book is in hand all 
at once, and one may scan, skim, or skip back at will. Such is not an option 
for the ordinary film viewer (at least, until the arrival of the vidéocassette). 
The Hollywood cinema paces its narration for maximum legibility; filmmakers 
have learned that, for perceivers who can not stop and go back, cues must be 
highly redundant. But in learning this, filmmakers have also learned how to 
prompt mwremembering. Given our effort after gist and our inability to turn 
back to check a point (especially one made ninety minutes earlier), the film 
can introduce both redundant cues and highly non-redundant, even 
contradictory, ones. 
The following chart "lines up" the two sequences, the opening murder 
(labeled A) and the climactic replay of the shooting (B). 
Spring 1992 193 
Mildred Pierce 
The opening scene and its replay 
Opening shots (A) 
1. (5 sec: extreme long shot) Beach 
house at night, car visible alongside. 
Dissolve to: 
2. (4 sec: long shot) House and car. 
Two shots heard. 
3. (8 sec: medium long shot) Monty 
facing camera, looking off left. 
Third and fourth shots hit mirror. 
Monty is hit, staggers forward, 
and falls to floor. A pistol is tossed 
into the frame. 
4. (13 sec: ms): Monty wobbles his 
head, opens his eyes, and says: 
"Mildred." 
Pan up to mirror; sound of door 
slamming. 
5. (Is) Empty parlor, with Monty's 
corpse in the firelight. Doorway 
empty. 
6. (Is) Car outside pulls off. 
Replay shots (B) 
1. (12 sec: medium shot) Mildred in 
car, trying to start engine. 
2. (4 sec: medium close-up): 
Mildred slumped over steering 
wheel. Two shots heard. 
3. (5 sec: ms) Veda fires four times. 
4. (6 sec: ms) Monty is staggering 
forward and falls to floor. A pistol 
is tossed into the frame. 
Monty wobbles his head, eyes 
open, and says: "Mildred." 
5. (Is) Pan with Mildred coming in; 
sound of door slamming. 
She meets Veda in the parlor 
doorway. 
6. - 9. In the parlor, the two women 
talk about covering up the crime. 
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The obvious redundancies serve to reassure us that we are seeing a 
straight replay. "In essence," we might say, the two presentations of the 
murder are similar. The scene reinforces this notion of exact repetition in 
more detailed ways. In the opening, over the second long-shot of the beach 
house (A2) we hear two revolver shots. The cut inside to Monty facing the 
killer comes right on the third shot. In the flashback version, the cut from 
Mildred in the car comes at exactly the same point; on the third shot (B3), 
Veda is revealed firing the pistol. No time can be said to be omitted here. 
More subtly, the screen time that elapses between the third shot and Monty's 
dying word is virtually identical in both versions (9 seconds and 10 seconds 
respectively). Again, there is no significant stretch of time left out. Finally, 
the slamming door we hear in the opening scene (A4) is revealed to be not the 
killer leaving, as we initially inferred, but rather the sound of Mildred entering 
to find Veda in the living room (B5). These are what the mystery novelist 
might consider fair misdirections of the spectator's attention. They suggest 
that the second version is identical with the first, except that the former 
explains certain obscure details of the latter. 
It would seem, however, that the narration profits from so many 
redundancies in order to introduce some significant disparities. True, some 
are just minor. In the initial scene (Al and A2), there is no sound of the car's 
starter cranking as Mildred tries to start it. (Perhaps Max Steiner's score 
smothers it.) There is, furthermore, no indication that Mildred is in the car in 
the first scene. (True, she is presumably slumped over the wheel, but scrutiny 
shows that the driver's seat is empty.15) These "trivial" cases show again the 
perceptual saliency of causal, event-centered information, especially as 
prepared by prior knowledge. On our first view of the first scene, the appar-
ent emptiness of the car suggests that the important action occurs inside the 
house. If anyone should recall that scene a hundred minutes later, the later 
shot of Mildred bent over the steering wheel (B2) suffices as a rough explana-
tion of why the car appeared empty. In the absence of a chance to go back 
and compare, the spectator can take the earlier scene as consistent with the 
later one. 
Other variations in handling reveal that the filmmakers are exploiting the 
viewer's inability to recall certain details. In the first scene, when Monty is 
shot (A3), he falls to the floor and rolls over on his back as the gun is tossed 
into the shot. There is a pause. Cut to a closer view of his face (A4). As his 
head wobbles, he opens his eyes, looking left as he murmurs, "Mildred" and 
expires. The close-up emphasizes his expression and the word he says, 
marking the event for us to notice and recall. It may also suggest that he dies 
looking at his killer and speaking her name. 
But in the second version, the event is treated differently; or rather, it is 
no longer the same event. Monty is shot and tumbles to the floor (B4), but 
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now he utters Mildred's name just as he starts to roll on his back. There is 
no close-up, and no pause either. He says nothing when he is in the position 
he assumed in the earlier scene (just as earlier, he said nothing when he rolled 
over). The second version produces a different effect: by speaking when he 
is not looking at his killer, he no longer seems to be naming the culprit but 
rather recalling Mildred. The narration gets two distinct cues out of the two 
versions, and it is able to do so because it counts on our remembering only 
that Monte said, "Mildred," not exactly when and how he said it. We recall the 
salient features marked out for us earlier, but not the details of each situation. 
Even more striking than the reconstitution of Monty's dying word is the 
disparity in the handling of the murder's aftermath. In the first scene (A4), 
a camera movement carries us from Monte's face to the bullet-pocked mirror, 
which shows a doorway giving onto the hall. We hear footsteps and a 
slamming door. Cut to a long shot (A5) of Monty lying in the empty parlor. 
Cut outside to the car pulling away, the driver dimly visible (A6). But the 
second version follows Monty's death and the slamming door by Mildred's 
lengthy and intense confrontation with Veda (B5-B9). And this encounter is 
played out exactly in the doorway that is shown empty in the first version's fifth 
shot of the empty parlor! Moreover, since the second version never completes 
the scene between Mildred and Veda, there is no depiction of either one 
driving off after their interchange. (Indeed, we never learn their arrangements 
about leaving, or how, if Veda took the car, Mildred got to the pier.) 
If we try to make the two versions compatible, we must posit that in the 
first version, there is an ellipsis of several minutes between the end of the 
mirror shot (A4) and the beginning of A5, which presumably depicts Monty 
lying dead in the room after Mildred and Veda have gone their ways. Such 
an ellipsis is, of course, not marked at all. Indeed, one overriding default 
assumption of the classical film is that a cut within a defined locale is taken to 
convey continuous duration unless there are technical or contextual indications 
to the contrary (e.g., a dissolve or some drastic change of costume or 
furnishings). Alternatively, it is possible in retrospect to construe shot A5, the 
long-shot of Monty's corpse stretched out, as purely and simply a false image, 
present solely to mislead us. Either way, the opening scene's narration has 
concealed the crucial point that two women were present, and it has cued the 
viewer to infer the gist of the situation-a man was killed and a woman fled the 
scene~in a fashion whose details cannot be recalled. 
We can be fairly confident about this memory lapse. Untutored, first-
time spectators seem not to notice the disparities between the two versions, 
and critics who have written on the film have not mentioned them. Indeed, 
critics have proven especially vulnerable to remembering gist and forgetting 
detail. One writer, describing the first scene shot by shot, omits the crucially 
misleading shot of Monty's corpse by the fire (A5).16 Another claims that in 
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the second murder scene, the shot of Veda firing the pistol follows the shot of 
Monty.17 In fact, I know of no critic who has discussed the disparities between 
versions. If critics who have the luxury of "paging back" through the film can 
err in such ways, should we be surprised that a writer in 1947, relying on mere 
memory, fleshes out what he saw: he cites "the sequence of camera shots in 
which we see the outside of the house, the woman's figure (or was it two 
figures separately?) leaving it, her ride in the auto. . . ,"18 And if you feel a 
need to check my claims to confirm your own recollections, you realize that I 
am not condemning these critics. They are merely doing what we all do, 
"making sense," and they are making it along the lines laid down by a very 
powerful sysem of norms. It is not just that the film encourages us to deceive 
ourselves; it deceives us blatantly, but helps us forget its own operations. And 
it accomplishes this by its tacit knowledge of how narrative comprehension 
involves going beyond the data, jumping to conclusions-in short, of making 
inferences and hypotheses. 
IV 
A lone example cannot prove a case, but I hope that this examination of 
Mildred Pierce has illustrated how one version of the cognitive perspective can 
tie together assumptions about spectatorial comprehension with concrete 
observations about a film's structure and style. The result is a significantly new 
picture of a film and its viewer. 
Instead of a "pure" text, understandable "in itself," we have a text that 
gains its effects only in relation to a body of norms, a set of schemata, and the 
processes which the spectator initiates. Instead of a communication model, 
which treats meaning as dropped in upstream to be fished out by the spectator, 
we have a constructive model which treats meaning as an expanding elabo-
ration of cues located in the text. This shift implies that, armed with certain 
schemata and knowledge of certain norms, the spectator could "go beyond the 
information given" in ways unforeseen by the filmmakers. What makes a film 
understandable is not necessarily exhausted by what the filmmakers 
deliberately put in to be understood. 
In isolating comprehension as a central viewing activity, the cognitive 
perspective is open to the charge that it ignores other aspects of the experience 
and of the film itself. What, for instance, about emotion, surely a prime 
ingredient of the filmgoing experience? And what about interpretation, which 
seems to go even farther beyond the information given and involve very high-
level constructs? 
These are important questions, and the cognitive frame of reference 
needs to respond to them. Up to a point, setting emotion aside is a useful 
methodological idealization: in principle, you can understand a film without 
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discernibly having an emotional reaction to it. More positively, recent studies 
by Noël Carroll, Murray Smith, and Ed Tan suggest that a cognitive 
perspective can enrich our understanding of emotive and identificatory quali-
ties.19 This research boldly proposes that many emotional responses ride upon 
cognitive judgments. 
As for interpretation, elsewhere I have tried to show that, as an intuitive 
but principled activity, it is highly amenable to a cognitive explanation. When 
a critic posits Mildred as the Castrating Mother or a symbol of the 
contradictions of entrepreneurial capitalism, the critic is still seeking out cues, 
categorizing, applying schemata, and making inferences that carry weight 
among a particular social group.20 To interpret is to cognize, albeit in a certain 
way. 
There is much more to understand about how viewers understand films. 
The line of inquiry sketched here puts a priority on studying particular films 
in the light of how narrational and stylistic processes are designed to elicit 
certain spectatorial effects. In this research program, Mildred Pierce 
exemplifies key features of the classical Hollywood film; there are, I argue 
elsewhere, other traditions which call on different sorts of cues, schemata, and 
norms.21 Such research is usefully considered part of a broader research 
program I have called a film "poetics."22 By avoiding misplaced conceptions of 
codes or treacherous analogies between film and language, the cognitive 
perspective allows us to oppose a narrow semiotics with a wide-ranging, 
theoretically informed historical poetics of cinema. 
Madison, Wisconsin 
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